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Abstract: 
This article examines the feasibility of designing and implementing a cybercrime prevention 
monitoring approach to enhance the quality of knowledge about policies that aim to reduce the 
prevalence and impact of online harms. Despite very significant investments made by 
governments over the past decade to improve the cybersecurity of publicly and privately-operated 
computer systems, there is very limited systematic knowledge about what cybercrime prevention 
policies have been adopted in various parts of the world and even less knowledge about their 
effectiveness in reducing the exposure of individuals and organizations to cybercrime. Borrowing 
from the policy monitoring (or policy surveillance) methodology that was developed in a broad 
range of fields such as public health and education, this article argues that such an approach would 
be critical in advancing our understanding of what is being done to control cybercrime, what 
works, what doesn’t, and what is promising. This article provides an overview of the principles and 
benefits of the policy monitoring approach, reviews the main features of a sample of 18 policy 
monitoring platforms, assesses a dozen cybersecurity policy rating initiatives—concluding that 
very few of them include cybercrime in their framework, then provides a template for the creation 
of a dedicated cybercrime prevention monitoring tool that would benefit academics, policy-
makers and practitioners. 
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Introduction 
The statistics available on cybercrime, although imprecise and fragmentary (Florêncio and Herley 
2013, Furnell et al. 2015, Levi 2017, Reep-van den Bergh and Junger 2018), are staggering. In 2014, 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in a report sponsored by the security firm 
McAfee, estimated that cybercrime and espionage cost $445 billion annually worldwide (CSIS 
2014). In 2015 the insurance company Lloyd’s arrived at almost the same number ($400 billion a 
year) for the costs of cyber-attacks and the disruptions they cause to businesses (Gandel 2015). A 
more cautious and conservative assessment, made by a group of computer scientists and 
criminologists who extrapolated their numbers from U.K. data, suggests that the global cost of 
cybercrime during the 2010s could reach $75 billion—$225 billion if traditional crimes that are 
transitioning to cyber are included (Anderson et al. 2013). In Canada, one of the most recent and 
comprehensive surveys, conducted in 2017 with a representative sample of 10,000 businesses, 
found that companies of all sizes had spent Can$14 billion over the previous year to protect their 
systems against various forms of online harm, and that over one fifth of them had been impacted 
by a cybersecurity incident (Bilodeau et al. 2019). As a result, cyber-risks have topped the list of 
security concerns for government and business leaders in the past few years and even more 
disruptive outcomes are anticipated as our societies become increasingly cyber-dependent and 
interconnected (WEF 2017, Zurich 2014). Despite the global scope and impact of cybercrime, few 
tools are available to assess effective policies for reducing cybercrime. This study fills this gap in 
the literature.  
The figures on cybersecurity are also striking. The global market for cybersecurity products 
and services is estimated to have reached $120 billion in 2017, a 35-fold increase over the past 13 
years, with a predicted growth rate of 12-15% until 2021 (Cybersecurity Ventures 2017). Gartner 
(2017), a widely cited consultancy, produced a more conservative assessment, with a worldwide 
spending estimate of $86.4 billion for 2017 and 7% annual growth. These numbers are impressive 
in the current economic context where slow growth has become the norm for Western 
economies. In addition, recent events in the U.S., the U.K., France, and approximately 40 other 
nations have shown that cyber threats can move beyond critical infrastructures and online 
financial services to target electoral processes and undermine trust in democratic institutions (CSE 
2017). 
In response to this fast-changing risk landscape, governments across the world are designing 
cybersecurity policies and allocating billions of dollars of their defense and R&D budgets to new 
programs that will enhance their ability to address cyber risks. The U.S. federal government, for 
example, will spend almost $16.6 billion in 2019 on cybersecurity  (The White House 2019). In the 
U.K., in November 2015 the chancellor announced cybersecurity investments of £1.9 billion over 
five years, which will bring the government’s overall commitment for cybersecurity to £3.2 billion 
(Osborne 2015). Australia, a middle power, announced a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy in 
2016 with allocations of AU$230 million over five years (Duckett 2016). The European Union has 
focused its cybersecurity investments on R&D with a plan to fund businesses and universities to 
the extent of €450 million over four years (2017 to 2020), with public-private collaborations 
expected to leverage three times more in matching funds (European Commission 2016). 
Despite these massive investments in cybercrime-prevention and cybersecurity policies, 
very few tools are available to help policy makers and the public determine the effectiveness of 
government interventions against online harms. This article examines the potential of policy 
monitoring tools to fill this gap. Policy monitoring is an evidence-based approach developed by 
public policy scholars as a way to assess and compare the effectiveness of laws and policies. It 
relies on systematic collection of data on the design and implementation of policies, rigorous 
evaluation of their impact, and wide dissemination of these assessments. This article argues that 
a policy monitoring platform could encourage the creation of a more robust knowledge base about 
the cybercrime prevention initiatives being developed around the world, in order to facilitate the 
dissemination of effective policies and discourage the adoption of counterproductive 
interventions.  
I discuss the rationale and need for a policy monitoring approach in the field of cybercrime 
prevention in the first section and introduce its main principles in the second section. The third 
section reviews a small sample of established policy monitoring platforms to identify their main 
features, as well as their limitations. I then focus on half a dozen cybersecurity rating initiatives 
that attempt to assess the efforts of various countries and international organizations to mitigate 
cyber-harms, highlighting not only their strengths but also their relative lack of importance for 
cybercrime prevention policies. Finally, I explore why criminologists should consider establishing 
a cybercrime prevention monitoring platform and how such a platform could operate. This article 
is more a call to action to cybercrime researchers and practitioners to enhance the quality of their 
knowledge about what exists and what works in cybercrime prevention than a traditional 
theoretical or empirical contribution about a specific type of cybercrime and the public and private 
responses to it.      
 
1. The need for more systematic tracking of cybercrime prevention policies and programs  
The numbers cited in the introduction reflect only a fraction of the significant budgets allocated 
by governments, international organizations, and businesses in attempts to address the complex 
problems created by cybercrime. Unfortunately there is no source of consolidated data that would 
make it possible to measure and track these efforts at global, national, or even local levels, nor is 
there a centralized database of the various policies and programs implemented by public, private, 
and community stakeholders. This lack of information, in a budgetary context where the billions 
of dollars now being spent on cybersecurity will increase at a steady pace for the next few years, 
is problematic for three main reasons. 
First, it prevents us from systematically and empirically assessing the nature, effectiveness, 
and efficiency of the various cybercrime prevention programs that are being developed and 
implemented across the world (Hutchings and Holt 2017). A few criminological studies have 
attempted to evaluate the deterrence effects of warning banners on attacked computer systems 
(Maimon et al. 2014), the protective effects of using financial intelligence to warn potential online 
fraud victims (Cross 2016), and the disruptive and mitigating effects generated when large 
software companies and Internet Service Providers combat botnets (Dupont 2017). However each 
of these studies not only focused on a specific form of cybercrime and intervention strategy but 
also adopted a different methodology, making comparisons difficult. The lack of a common 
framework for tracking cybercrime prevention policies and their innovative features—which 
would be a first step towards a more rigorous measurement of their impact (for instance whether 
they achieve their objectives at a reasonable cost)—severely limits the evidence base for 
determining which approaches work, do not work, or are promising (Sherman et al. 1997). Making 
important decisions on flimsy evidence creates the risk that ineffective programs will receive 
undue attention and investments while proven strategies are ignored. 
Second, at the international level, this lack of baseline information restricts the 
dissemination of knowledge and both impedes the adoption of policies that have been proven to 
deliver positive outcomes and prevents the debunking of failed or counterproductive policies. 
Lessons learned locally are not shared globally, although cybercrime problems are very similar 
across countries at comparable stages of economic and technological development. A more 
sustained and systematic knowledge transfer effort could help both mature and emerging digital 
economies share the benefits of a safer online ecosystem. 
Finally, the absence of a common framework for analyzing cybercrime prevention policies 
hinders coordination efforts that could deliver more effective responses to transnational 
cybercrime and cyber-risks. While international organizations such as the International 
Telecommunications Union and  Interpol or European agencies such as Europol and ENISA have 
all started to develop ambitious capacity-building initiatives to support developed and developing 
countries in their efforts to protect their citizens against cyber harms, the absence of systematic 
knowledge about which policies are already being implemented by which countries, at what cost, 
and with what results reduces the opportunities for policy harmonization and synchronization.    
 Cybercrime is not the only policy domain in which there is a lack of integration in the 
information needed to facilitate the implementation of effective or promising policies and 
intervention strategies in diverse local and national contexts. Complex policy domains such as 
public health, education, environmental protection, urban planning, and criminal justice have all 
attempted to address similar information deficits by developing policy monitoring or policy 
surveillance methodologies. (Although the two terminologies may appear different, they reflect 
very similar objectives and outcomes and are used interchangeably in this article.)  
 
2. Policy surveillance: definition and principles 
Policy surveillance can be defined as “the systematic collection, analysis and dissemination 
of information about laws and other policies” (Chriqui et al. 2011: 21). Its main objective is to learn 
“which policy-making entities are doing what through ‘mapping studies’ that capture the content 
and variation of policies across jurisdictions or institutions” (Burris et al. 2016: 1063). Such 
surveillance differs from more classical policy analysis in its scientific design, which includes 
rigorous protocols that support the monitoring process and specify the laws and policies of 
interest, outlines of inclusion and exclusion criteria, acknowledgment of search methodologies 
and their limits, and quantitative and qualitative coding schemes that minimize analyst subjectivity 
(Burris et al. 2010: 182). Policy surveillance adopts a dynamic approach through regular updates 
to the data as tracking the progress of policies at specific reference dates or intervals makes 
longitudinal analyses of outcomes and impacts possible (Burris et al. 2016: 1069).  
Policy surveillance is heavily influenced by its research focus: its core objective is to facilitate 
the implementation of effective policies that can benefit the common good and to do so by laying 
the foundation for impact studies that evaluate the effectiveness of a broad range of options. By 
making their datasets publicly available (usually through websites) and providing stakeholders and 
the general public with powerful search and visualization tools, policy monitoring initiatives hope 
not only to foster research projects that can evaluate important policies at reduced costs but also 
to make it simpler for policymakers and end users to understand the large number of policies and 
key subcomponents relevant to their area of interest and to increase their analytical and 
innovation capacities (Burris et al. 2016: 1070). This systematic approach to the creation of 
transferable and assessable knowledge is particularly important when policy domains are heavily 
influenced by opinion, politics, and hype, as is the case for cybercrime and cybersecurity (Lee and 
Rid 2014).   
As monitoring resources are finite, it is important to recognize that not all policies deserve 
to be systematically documented. Presley et al. (2015: 55-56) suggest five criteria, listed here in 
order of decreasing importance, to help researchers select the most relevant policies. Although 
these criteria originate in the public health field, they are general enough to apply to most other 
policy domains: 
1. Significance of the problem (policy deals with a pressing issue); 
2. Salience (policy reflects the aggregate interest of a broad range of stakeholders); 
3. Existence of evidence or evaluation (prioritizes evaluation of policies that have been 
widely adopted but not yet evaluated); 
4. Adopted as a national priority (policy affects how national strategies are implemented 
and translated into measurable programs); 
5. Determination of cost (cost of policy surveillance varies greatly depending on information 
accessibility and complexity). 
 
3. Existing policy surveillance platforms 
One indicator of policy surveillance’s usefulness to decision makers is its growth in popularity 
over the past few years. For example, Presley et al. (2015: 41-51) list more than 160 U.S. 
surveillance resources that follow policies in domains as diverse as tobacco control, school 
nutrition, anti-bullying, immigration, and climate change, among others. International 
organizations such as the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization also 
track policy surveillance tools that facilitate global comparisons (Burris et al. 2016: 1071). The 
Campbell Collaboration, an international clearinghouse that promotes evidence-based policies 
and practices, lists more than two dozen evidence portals that provide policy monitoring 
functions2. 
In order to better understand how policy surveillance platforms are developed and 
maintained, and what kind of data they provide their users, an extensive literature review was 
conducted.  Eighteen policy surveillance platforms that had been examined in depth were 
identified and the organization and availability of their data online was analyzed. The policy 
monitoring tools used by these platforms are described in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Systematic analysis of these platforms was performed to understand how they generate 
value for their users and for policy makers. Eight key dimensions that seem particularly relevant 
to the implementation of a policy monitoring approach to cybercrime prevention were identified 
and coded, making it possible to highlight the incidence of certain features. 
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1. Policy surveillance tools are most developed in public health: policy surveillance thrives 
in fields of study where evidence-based approaches are well established: public health 
accounts for 72% of the sample, followed by crime and justice (17%), youth development 
(6%), and cross-sectoral (6%) platforms. 
2. Policy surveillance tools are jointly developed by public agencies and non-profits: 
Leadership in creating and maintaining these monitoring tools is shared between public 
sector agencies (50%) and non-profits and NGOs such as academic institutions and non-
profit foundations (39%), with the remaining 11% reflecting joint efforts by these two 
groups. 
3. Policy surveillance tools are most developed in the US and focus more on geographical 
than on temporal comparisons: The sample described here is very U.S. centric, with more 
than half the platforms reviewed comparing legislation, policies, and programs across 
American municipalities and states (56%) while only one platform (6%) provides 
international comparative data. Policies are described as isolated initiatives in 39% of the 
reviewed databases, although many policies and programs are delivered as part of 
complex national or local strategies involving multiple approaches. Only two platforms 
(crimesolutions.gov and coalition4evidence.org) provide multiple evaluation results that 
can be compared and averaged out for each selected program to account for the various 
levels of scientific rigour that characterize evaluative studies carried out by different 
teams in different settings. Finally, only 28% of the reviewed platforms track and compare 
policies and legislation over time, making it possible to account for variations and stability. 
4. Policy surveillance tools rely on secondary data: in terms of data sourcing, all of the 
reviewed platforms (100%) use data and information produced by third parties, such as 
program implementation agencies, official statistical sources, or independent evaluators. 
The costs of collecting data or conducting evaluations independently appear to be 
prohibitive, which means that the quality and integrity of the secondary data used by 
these platforms needs to be thoroughly assessed. 
5. All policy surveillance tools are based on literature reviews: as a direct consequence of 
the aggregation approach highlighted above, all platforms (100%) rely on literature 
reviews for descriptions and evaluations of the policies and programs they include in their 
databases. The depth of these literature reviews varies greatly: while certain platforms 
provide long lists of peer-reviewed references for every program included in their 
database, others prefer to focus on a limited number of studies (usually one or two) that 
provide the most detailed description or evaluation of a policy or program’s outcomes. 
In less mature policy fields, monitoring platforms must rely on official reports, usually 
produced by program implementers, or on articles published in professional or 
mainstream media. 
6. Only slightly more than half of policy surveillance tools (56%) provide evaluation 
outcomes for the policies or programs they include.  The remaining 44% focus on 
comprehensive descriptions of local legislative or policy frameworks in the hope that this 
formatted data will be useful to future independent evaluators. Most platforms that rate 
the effectiveness of policies use the ‘gold standard’ of Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) 
as their main criteria (Sampson 2010; Bothwell et al. 2016; Fagan and Buchanan 2016). 
Some, such as the Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy, even require the replication of 
findings using a second RCT in a different implementation site to qualify for the ‘Top Tier’ 
category. Others, such as the Centre for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, are more flexible 
and include evaluations designated as ‘moderately rigorous’. These less rigorous 
methodologies do not use RCTs but rely on carefully selected and controlled comparison 
groups. Based on evaluation data collected from third parties, program or policy 
outcomes are usually categorized as negative (ineffective or harmful), neutral 
(nsignificant, inconclusive, mixed results), or positive (promising, effective). 
7. Only one third of monitoring platforms provide free access to the secondary data on 
which their assessment is based. Only 39% of surveillance platforms provide access to the 
full text of the legislative documents or scientific studies they analyze. The other 
platforms require users to be familiar with the use of legal databases or to have access to 
expensive academic online journals in order to review documentary materials.   
8. More than half of monitoring tools offer download options at zero cost to access raw 
data: 61% of the monitoring tools analyzed in our sample enable users to download their 
datasets directly to perform new analyses, usually in Excel or CSV file formats; more rarely 
as SPSS files. All the platforms that provide this download functionality do it free of 
charge, although one (the Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights) offers to provide 
specialized data extraction services on a fee-for-service basis. 
This summary review of a limited sample of policy monitoring platforms illustrates the 
practical challenges associated with the development of such tools in complex domains such as 
cybercrime prevention. Not all policy fields are mature enough to have access to well-established 
and well-funded program evaluation resources that can be leveraged to rate the effectiveness – 
or lack thereof – of policies. Cybercrime prevention is one of these; a policy monitoring platform 
in this domain would therefore need to adopt a more descriptive approach in the initial stages, as 
scientific evidence for the effectiveness of policies remains limited. In addition to international 
comparisons, one of its primary functions would be to highlight and outline policies and programs 
that require thorough evaluation before they can be promoted as successful strategies that 
deserve to be replicated.    
Because cybercrime is a global problem addressed by local jurisdictions, the level of 
comparison should by definition cover local and national initiatives implemented in a broad range 
of countries. This would obviously have a significant impact on the resources needed to collect 
and analyze data required for this type of international comparative effort. For example, to 
capture policies and programs implemented in non-English speaking countries, which contain a 
majority of the world population and its internet users, people who can process official and 
scientific documents written in various languages must be recruited and trained. Clear selection 
and coding procedures that can be applied consistently by a significant number of collaborators 
must be designed, tested, and explained. 
The multidisciplinary nature of cybercrime prevention policies, which often have legal, 
technical, and social implications, means that the information collected by a policy monitoring tool 
should also reflect these complementary dimensions. Such efforts are most likely to succeed if 
they involve researchers from a range of disciplines, such as criminology, computer science, 
psychology, law, political science, sociology, and economics, to name the most relevant ones. 
Given the ubiquity of technology in modern societies, cybercrime prevention policies cut across 
multiple policy domains that were once considered to belong to discrete spheres of activity, such 
as crime prevention, national security, critical infrastructure protection, research and 
development, economic development, standardization, privacy protection, or education. As a 
result, efforts to monitor cybercrime prevention policies will require the mobilization of diverse 
forms of expertise.  
 
4. Existing cybercrime prevention and cybersecurity policy monitoring tools 
Several initiatives have already been created to consolidate information – objectives, level of 
maturity, and, to a lesser extent, outcomes – about cybercrime prevention and cybersecurity 
policies. A quick overview of these efforts and their main features is provided in this section in 
order to assess what has already been done and what knowledge gaps need to be filled. Although 
every effort has been made to include all known policy monitoring platforms in the cyber-domain, 
the dynamic nature of this area of research means that some recent initiatives may have been 
overlooked. The initiatives are discussed alphabetically.  
The Cyber Readiness Index (CRI)3 was initially developed in 2013 by Melissa Hathaway (a 
former Bush and Obama administration official) for the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 
(Hathaway 2013), and updated in 2015. The CRI examines the level of maturity that countries 
demonstrate in their efforts to develop cybersecurity capacities (Hathaway et al. 2015) and 
attempts to measure a country’s operational capacities across seven dimensions: national 
strategy, incident response, e-crime and law enforcement, information sharing, investment in 
research and development (R&D), diplomacy and trade, and defense and crisis response. Each 
dimension is broken down into four components: statement (the existence of formal policies), 
organization (the existence of institutions that can implement those policies), resources (the 
allocation of financial and human resources as well as the establishment of measurement tools to 
assess the impact of cyber threats and the policies that address them), and implementation 
(evidence for the effectiveness of policies). Three levels of preparedness are used to assess each 
dimension: insufficient evidence (data is unavailable or inaccessible), partially operational (outputs 
are observed but their functionality remains difficult to measure), and fully operational 
(functioning activities can be observed and measured). It should be noted that the metrics used in 
this methodology focus more on the outputs of policies or how they are implemented than on 
their outcomes or what effects they produce. As of April 2019, the Cyber Readiness Team had 
released eleven in-depth country profiles for France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Morocco, the 
Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 
Each country report can be downloaded as a PDF file but direct cross-country comparisons are not 
possible. Most of the data used in the country profiles is qualitative.  
The Cybersecurity Capacity Portal,4 maintained by the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre 
at the University of Oxford, provides general information about national and international 
capacity-building initiatives. It has developed a Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations 
(CMM) that assesses the capacities of countries across five dimensions5: policy and strategy; 
culture and society; education, training, and skills; legal and regulatory frameworks; and 
standards, organizations, and technologies. Each dimension includes sub-factors that seem 
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exclusively qualitative and focus more on policy implementation and outputs than on outcomes. 
Each sub-factor is rated on a five-level scale (startup, formative, established, strategic, and 
dynamic). Of the 24 dimensions and sub-factors that make up the model, only one addresses the 
issue of cybercrime, folding investigation and prevention activities into a single component. The 
Portal website indicates that the CMM has been deployed in over 100 countries with financial 
support from the World Bank, the International Telecommunication Union, and other 
international organizations but only fourteen detailed country profiles (Albania, Bhutan, Cyprus, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Senegal, Sierra Leone,  
Uganda, and the U.K.) and a regional report providing a high-level analysis of 32 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries6 are available for download.       
The EU and Asia-Pacific Cybersecurity Dashboards are produced by The Software Alliance7, 
a business group that represents the software industry. Their aim is to assess the maturity of 
cybersecurity policies for 28 European and 10 Asian countries. Each country is assessed on 25 
criteria, mainly directed toward programs and activities grouped in five themes: legal foundations, 
operational entities, public-private partnerships, sector-specific cybersecurity plans, and 
education. Each criterion is rated as met, partially met, or absent. Data collection was carried out 
in 2015 and has not been updated since. There is no consolidated index or score and no ranking 
of countries. The downloadable PDF reports provide brief country profiles with additional 
qualitative information highlighting specific policies.        
The GFCE Inventory (Global Forum on Cyber Expertise)8, like the Cybersecurity Capacity 
Portal, is maintained by the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre at the University of Oxford. It 
lists and describes international programs and initiatives by public and private stakeholders that 
seek to enhance cybersecurity and prevent cybercrime. The database is searchable by region (East 
Asia, Europe, North America, etc.) and theme (cybercrime, cybersecurity, data protection, e-
governance). The descriptions of initiatives (usually a single sentence) contain summarized 
information about sponsor organizations, partners, targeted countries and groups, aims and 
objectives, types of activities undertaken, expected outcomes, time frames, and contact details. 
Little information is provided about the actual implementation and outcome of the listed 
initiatives. It is difficult to determine the number of initiatives listed in the Inventory, but as of April 
2019, 45 vignettes were available in the cybercrime category. These vignettes cover a very diverse 
set of initiatives promoted by international organizations such as the UN, the Council of Europe, 
Interpol, and Europol, as well as capacity-building and training initiatives offered to developing 
nations by developed countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. as part of their international 
assistance programs.          
The Global Cybersecurity Index is published by the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU)9. The first version was released in 2014, with a second updated version published in 2017 
and a third draft released in 2019. This database rates the cybersecurity capacities of 194 countries 
across five dimensions: legal measures, technical measures, organizational measures, capacity 
building, and cooperation, which are further broken down into 25 indicators. The ITU makes it very 
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clear that the GCI measures the commitment of countries based on the actions they are taking 
rather than the impact their engagement has for users, such as increasing levels of protection. In 
the area of cybercrime, for example, the GCI’s main concerns are the existence or absence of 
cybercrime legislation and law enforcement capacities. The effectiveness of the legislative 
framework and investigative or information-sharing initiatives are not measured. The GCI 
incorporates both primary data provided by countries themselves and publicly available secondary 
data. The weighting of the data produces a final country score that ranges from 0 to 1, with the 
U.K. the highest ranked country for 2018 with a score of 0.931 (ITU 2018), having replaced 
Singapore, whose score dropped from 0.925 to 0.898 in one year (ITU 2017a). More detailed 
country profiles were available for download on the ITU’s website until the end of 2017 but have 
now been removed. An interactive tool allowing comparisons between countries remains online 
but without access to supporting data10. The data tables on which the final scores are calculated 
are not available for download.       
The International Cyber Developments Review (INCYDER)  database  is maintained by 
the NATO Cooperative  Cyber Defense  Centre  of  Excellence 11. It lists legal and policy 
documents adopted by seventeen international and regional organizations such as the UN, the 
OECD, the G7, the EU, etc. Because of its cyber defense focus, the INCYDER database contains very 
few cybercrime-related documents and does not include international police cooperation 
organizations such as Interpol or Europol in its coverage. The original documents are 
downloadable from the INCYDER platform and searchable by keyword, topic, and date. 
Background notes on the cybersecurity responsibilities of each international organization are also 
available. INCYDER does not address policy outcomes, nor does it include references to scientific 
publications that discuss and/or evaluate these policies.  
The National Cyber Security Index (NCSI) was launched in 2016 by the Estonian e-Governance 
Academy12, with support from the Estonian government and international private sector partners. 
This two-year,  €200,000 project developed a methodology to measure countries’ preparedness 
to prevent cyber threats, as well as their readiness to respond to cyber-attacks. The Index ranks 
130 countries and is structured around 46 indicators arranged in three main categories (general 
cybersecurity, baseline cybersecurity, and incident and crisis management) and twelve 
capacities13. Points are assigned depending on the level of capacity achieved and an interactive 
tool allows between-country comparisons14. As in many other indexes, what gets measured is the 
existence of particular institutions and programs rather than their effectiveness—or lack thereof—
in providing protection against cyber threats. The four indicators that deal specifically with 
cybercrime focus mainly on investigative capacities (the existence of a legislative framework, a 
dedicated cybercrime unit, a digital forensics unit, or a 24/7 contact point for international 
cybercrime) and ignore the prevention activities of public and private security organizations.    
Although extremely valuable in providing frameworks that should enable governments to 
enhance their cybersecurity capacity and readiness, the methodologies, platforms, and indexes 
presented above also suffer from significant limitations. While the proliferation of reports 
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13 https://ncsi.ega.ee/methodology/ 
14 http://ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/#  
encourages broader conversations among stakeholders and increased production of relevant 
indicators and typologies, there is also a risk that overlap of effort will result in unhealthy 
competition and confusing results. A quick comparison of the top ten countries in the rankings 
published by the ITU’s GCI and the e-Governance Academy’s NCSI (shown in table 2) illustrates 
this point quite strikingly. Although the ITU and e-Governance Academy use very similar indicators, 
they agree on only half of the top ten performers – the Czech Republic, which comes first in the 
NCSI ranking, is 71st in the GCI, while the UK and the US, which rank as first and second in the GCI 
only appear in 14th and 29th position in the NCSI ranking. These major discrepancies derive from 
the data collection process: the quality of information available remains uneven from one country 
to another and becomes subject to interpretation by rating teams when they have to assign a 
score to a particular institutional setup with which they may not be very familiar. For example, the 
main reason why the US is ranked so poorly by the NCSI is that it received 0 point for the existence 
of a cyber threats analysis unit, 0 point for the publication of an annual public cyber threat report, 
0 point for the existence of a competent supervisory authority for digital services, does not have 
a government-led e-identification scheme, and received 0 point on the protection of personal data 
criteria. By contrast, the Czech Republic received top scores on each of these dimensions from 
NCSI, despite a much tougher assessment by the GCI team. Biases are inevitably introduced when 
complex whole-of-government policies are reduced to easily-digestible metrics, despite the raters’ 
best intentions, but they remain highly problematic when they generate such variance in ranking 
outcomes for certain countries. A similar lack of consistency has also been noted for crime 
prevention registries and illustrates the challenge of trying to rate the effectiveness of a policy or 
a country performance (Fagan and Buchanan 2016: 21).  
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The platforms reviewed above use countries as their unit of analysis to produce aggregate 
scores or assessments. This approach supports global policy transfers but prevents researchers 
and decision makers from examining the individual benefits or failures of specific policies and 
programs. As a result of this broad country-focused approach, and also because there is a paucity 
of quantitative data available on cybersecurity capacities and their effects, all of the monitoring 
platforms rely on qualitative data sourced from official and legal documents: the metrics produced 
by these initiatives are derived from the accumulation of publicly available information on the 
existence or absence of a limited set of institutions, programs, and practices. This explains to a 
large extent why, despite claims of evidence-based methodologies, most platforms focus more on 
the implementation of policies and their outputs – such as the development of emergency 
response teams, legal information sharing frameworks, public-private partnerships, or awareness 
programs – and less on the outcomes of those policies, which would require hard metrics such as 
investments made, infection rates recorded, or number of users protected from various harms. 
There is mounting evidence that there is a direct relationship between increased capacities and 
enhanced cybersecurity (Dutton et al. 2017), but a more granular understanding of which policies 
deliver what benefits and how they achieve these results remains elusive. 
Cybercrime remains a secondary concern for many of the cybersecurity policy monitoring 
initiatives reviewed in this article. This probably reflects the lack of resources allocated to police 
services to deal with cybercrime compared to the impressive investments made by governments 
to enhance the cyber-capacities of their armed forces and intelligence agencies, or the economic 
development investments made by public and private entities in order to join a thriving private 
cybersecurity market. The fact that criminologists are underrepresented in the growing field of 
cybersecurity studies and have received limited research funding to conduct empirical and 
evaluative research may also explain why cybercrime prevention policies remain an afterthought 
in the scientific literature, with a few notable exceptions (Holt and Bossler 2016, Button and Cross 
2017, Maimon and Louderback 2019).     
Finally, there are two additional limitations associated with the recency and availability of 
data on these platforms. First, very few indexes and platforms regularly update the data they 
collect. While this reflects the resource-intensive and time-consuming nature of such 
undertakings, it makes it difficult to map a country’s progress or change in policies. Second, the 
final products are released as ‘static’ PDF documents, which in several cases are complemented 
by interactive visualization tools. However, none of the cybersecurity initiatives reviewed here 
makes its databases available to third party researchers in a readily processable format (such as 
Excel files, for example).           
 
5. The case for a cybercrime prevention surveillance platform 
In light of the extensive policy surveillance knowledge that has been developed in domains such 
as public health, education, violence prevention, and environment protection, and considering 
how widespread cybercrime has become in contemporary societies, the creation of a cybercrime 
prevention surveillance tool that would complement the more general initiatives discussed above 
should be a priority. Such a platform could systematically collect detailed information about 
individual cybercrime prevention policies in a format that would facilitate their cataloguing, 
retrieval, analysis, and evaluation. This data should be updated regularly and accessible to 
independent researchers and policy makers, which would generate new insights on the 
effectiveness of existing policies, as well as their unintended or counterproductive effects.  
A pilot study for such a platform was conducted at the Université de Montréal’s International 
Centre of Comparative Criminology during the first half of 2017 with financial support from the 
Korean Institute of Criminology. The study was aimed at leveraging insights from existing policy 
surveillance tools to design a data-capture framework that incorporated the most relevant 
information about cybercrime prevention policies and then testing this framework on a small 
sample of policies to determine the feasibility and scalability of the approach. Table 3 gives an 
overview of the coding framework developed during the pilot.  
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The coding framework introduced above could be used to support an online cybercrime 
prevention monitoring platform with simple search functionalities. For example, a country or a 
local community planning to design a new cybercrime prevention program to combat online fraud 
or to prevent cyberbullying could examine the programs that already exist by searching the 
platform using relevant keywords (“anti-phishing campaigns” or “cyber-bullying programs”), but 
also by scanning the fields that describe the different targeted issues or undesirable situations. In 
the case of cyber-bullying, additional searches could also be performed to include other 
prevention programs that target the same population (youth) in order to identify various strategies 
that have been imagined to reach this particular group more effectively and with more credibilty. 
Alternative searches might also help policy designers extract inspiring ideas to expand their range 
of funding sources, implementation partners or incentivization strategies. Finally, search filters 
could also be used to quickly identify the implementation hurdles that similar programs have had 
to overcome and the solutions they came up with. The coding scheme presented here would also 
allow policy makers to quickly identify programs for which robust evaluations exist and to be 
exposed to a diversity of evaluative methodologies that they could borrow from. By providing 
additional references (both from the professional and scientific literatures), such a platform would 
also act as a online library on cybercrime prevention.  
New summaries would be added regularly. Specific types of interventions or countries could 
be prioritized to focus on policy innovation clusters or to test the effectiveness of promising 
strategies. Designing, implementing, and maintaining such a platform is an ambitious goal that will 
require development of a large-scale international collaboration network of researchers, policy-
makers, and volunteers. Ideally, contributors to the database would need to master the local 
languages in which cybercrime prevention policies are drafted, implemented, and evaluated to 
avoid over-reliance on English-language documents. Particular efforts should also be made to 
involve academics from the developing world, as more than four billion people have access to the 
internet through a mobile broadband connection and are therefore exposed to a broad range of 
online criminal harms that need to be addressed through a diverse set of prevention approaches 
(ITU 2017b). Despite these hurdles, I am convinced that creating such a cybercrime prevention 
monitoring platform and making its data publicly available and easily searchable would greatly 
advance our collective capacity to respond to online criminal harms.   
 
Conclusion 
Governments around the world use the labels “cybercrime” and “cybersecurity” to deliver a 
broad range of interventions designed to prevent and mitigate a diverse portfolio of online 
criminal harms. These interventions vary greatly in terms of goals, implementation, delivery 
strategies, levels of coerciveness, types of engagement with the private sector, and outcomes. 
However, most of them are similar in the unfortunate scarcity of empirical evaluations that could 
help policy-makers and citizens assess which policies are producing the expected results and which 
are underperforming or should be abandoned outright. This lack of evidence is surprising 
considering the technical nature of cybersecurity and the ease with which performance indicators 
and metrics can be collected using automated methods. Given the considerable investments being 
made by governments and organisations to improve cybersecurity, it is concerning that there are 
not more scientifically rigorous efforts being undertaken to establish which policies and programs 
are delivering measurable improvements to the safety of our digital ecosystem. In the limited 
sample of surveillance tools used in the pilot study discussed above, fewer than one third of the 
reviewed policies had been evaluated and even fewer had been assessed independently.   
The tools and platforms associated with the policy monitoring approach facilitate knowledge 
transfers, cross-jurisdictional comparisons, and evidence-based interventions. I have outlined the 
main features of a diversified sample of existing policy monitoring tools and shown how they could 
be applied to the field of cybercrime prevention, including the specific challenges that would need 
to be met. It is now up to cyber-criminologists to determine the relevance of this framework, its 
feasibility, and the collaborative resources that would be needed to translate it into reality.     
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Table 1. A Sample of Policy Surveillance Platforms Accessible Online (listed alphabetically) 




Public Health Provides detailed information on a wide variety of alcohol-related policies in 
the United States at both state and federal levels. Detailed state-by-state 
information is available for 35 alcohol-related policies. The website now has 





Public Health The American Nonsmokers' Rights Foundation U.S. Tobacco Control Laws 
Database has tracked, collected, and analyzed tobacco control ordinances, by-







Blueprints focuses on youth programs to prevent violence, delinquency, drug 






Criminal Justice The Evidence-Based Policing Matrix is a visualization tool that is mainly a 
meta-analysis of police interventions. It evaluates and lists all research studies 
on police interventions and classifies them across 3 axis:  
     - Focus; 
     - Reactiveness; 
     - Scope of target. 
http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/the-matrix/ 
Child Trends Public Health The Child Trends Data Bank includes regularly updated data on more than 125 
indicators of the well-being of children and youth, with clear summaries of the 
underlying research, explanation of important trends, and downloadable 





Public Health The Chronic Disease State Policy Tracking System is designed to provide 
detailed policy information to facilitate research and share how U.S. states are 






Public Health The CLASS website uses two policy classification systems to score state-level 
codified laws for physical education (PE) and nutrition in schools. Differences 
in codified state laws in nutrition and physical education across states are 





 Cross-sectoral The Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy listed and summarized programs that 
showed credible evidence of important effects on people’s lives in the fields 
of prenatal and early childhood care, K-12 education, teen pregnancy 
prevention, crime prevention, homelessness, employment and welfare, 
obesity and disease prevention, mental health, international development, 
etc. It wound down its operations in the spring of 2015; the Coalition’s 
leadership and core elements of the group’s work have been integrated into 
the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. The policy surveillance platform 
remains accessible online. 
http://coalition4evidence.org/ 
Crime Solutions 
Database - Office of 
Justice Programs 
Criminal Justice CrimeSolutions.gov is a database that contains information on justice-related 




Criminal Justice The Global Policing Database (GPD) is a web-based and searchable database 
designed to capture all published and unpublished experimental and quasi-




Public Health The Guttmacher Institute provides information on key sexual and 
reproductive health policies in the United States and globally. 
https://data.guttmacher.org/regions  
LawAtlas Public Health LawAtlas includes policy surveillance on a broad set of state laws including 
those pertaining to distracted driving, medical marijuana, access to naloxone, 
Good Samaritan overdose laws, water quality, and more. 
http://lawatlas.org/  
Law Center to 
Prevent Gun 
Violence 
Public Health The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence website covers over 35 domains 
related to gun laws (minimum age to purchase, universal background checks, 
assault weapons, imitation and toy guns, firearm registration, etc.). 
http://smartgunlaws.org/search-gun-law-by-gun-policy/  
http://gunlawscorecard.org/ 
National Registry of 
Evidence-based 
Programs and 
Practices (NREPP) - 
SAMHSA 
Public Health The National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices provides 
information on substance abuse and mental health interventions. 
http://nrepp.samhsa.gov/01_landing.aspx  
State Legislated 
Actions on Tobacco 
Issues (SLATI) 
Public Health SLATI tracks state tobacco control laws, such as restrictions on smoking in 
public places and workplaces and tobacco taxes, on an ongoing basis.  
http://www.lungusa2.org/slati/  
State School Health 
Policy Database 
Public Health The State School Health Policy Database tracks policies related to school 






Public Health The State Tobacco Activities Tracking & Evaluation System is an interactive 
application that presents current and historical state-level data on tobacco 
use prevention and controls. 
https://www.cdc.gov/statesystem/  





Table 2.  Comparison of Top Ten Performers in GCI  
and NCSI Indices 
Rank GCI 2018 NCSI 2019 
1. United Kingdom Czech Republic 
2. United States Estonia 
3. France Spain 
4. Lithuania Lithuania 
5. Estonia Greece 
6. Singapore France 
7. Spain Finland 
8. Malaysia Denmark 
9. Norway Netherlands 
10. Canada Germany 
 
  
Table 3. Structure of the Coding Framework 
Categories Data Fields 
Overview of the policy and search filters Summary 
Nature of the policy 
Related policies and legislation 
Keywords 
Snapshot data 
Description of the policy Date of implementation or launch 
Place of implementation 
Geographical scope 
Instigator of the policy 
Targeted issue or situation 
Targeted population 
Goals of the policy 
Components of the policy 
Agents in charge of implementation 
Costs 










Additional references URL 
Peer-reviewed publications 
Media articles 
Official documents 
 
